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1. Introduction 
In many European countries, voters increasingly use online Voting Advice Applications 
(Henceforth: VAAs) to help to decide how to vote during election time. The first VAA, using 
pen and paper, was launched in the Netherlands in 1989 (the Stemwijzer). VAAs are currently 
online during elections in many countries, e.g. Germany (Wahl-O-Mat), Belgium (Stemtest), 
Portugal (Bússola Eleitoral), Switserland (SmartVote), Ireland (Pick your party), Lithuania 
(Manobalsas). The objectives of these VAAs are twofold. First, they primarily aim to educate 
voters about the issues that are important during the coming election time, and about the 
position that political parties have about these issues (Cedroni and Garcia, 2010). Second, the 
VAAs are increasingly used for gathering data on voter opinions, which are then used for 
scientific studies (Mendez et al., 2014).  
To educate voters and elicit their preferences, classic VAAs use variations on a 
common design (Cedroni and Garcia, 2010). They usually ask prospective voters for their 
opinion on a number of statements. From the answers the applications then provide a 
recommendation, either by reporting how well respondents’ answers correspond with the 
positions of one or more parties on the presented items, or by presenting voters with their 
location on a multidimensional political plane. Data are stored and analyzed statistically. This 
method has some problems, which are widely discussed in literature. First, the provided 
advice is highly dependent on the choice of statements (Walgrave et al., 2009), which might 
be problematic as the range of statements does not necessarily cover the most important issues 
in the elections, the statements might not allow for enough discriminatory power between 
parties, political parties might have a large role in their positioning on the statements and the 
positioning of parties might not reflect the real position of the parties on the issues especially 
when political parties are allowed to fill in their own positions (Groot, 2003). Second, the 
advice is also sensitive to decision rules used to translate respondents’ answers to 
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recommendations (Kleinnijenhuis and Krouwel, 2008; Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2012; 
Louwerse and Rosema, 2014). A third problem, most pressing when aiming to use VAAs for 
data gathering purposes, lies in the fact that VAA users usually are not representative for the 
population of countries’ electorates (Wall et al., 2009).  
The issues of sample representativeness and sensitivity to statement selection and 
calculation algorithms are widely acknowledged and well-studied. However, in light of recent 
findings from behavioral economics and experimental psychology, we argue that existing 
VAAs also suffer from more fundamental problems that are not yet sufficiently recognized. 
First, the assumption of issue orthogonality that underlies all existing VAAs is hardly 
realistic. That is, classic VAAs assume that voter and party positions on the various issues are 
independent of one another. However, deciding on a vote arguably involves more than having 
an opinions on a number of unrelated statements. When classic VAA’s present solely 
independent statements on which the participants has to form an opinion, they falsely create 
the impression that voting does not actually require trade-offs. Second, VAA methodology 
strongly relies on the assumption of rationality. That is, the quality of recommendations 
strongly depends on the assumption that users’ responses to items actually reflect the accurate 
outcome of a rational evaluation their preferences and interests (Downs, 1957As insights from 
psychology and behavioral economics show, decision-making is often distorted by various 
cognitive biases and misconceptions (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Shafir and LeBoeuf, 
2002). For example, voters might be aware a priori of their preference for a political party or 
position on the left-right spectrum and subconsciously answer the items in such a way that 
they end up with an advice for a party that they already had in mind. Classic VAA 
methodology can only deal with these issues in a limited way.  
In this paper, we propose an innovative method for providing voter advice that does 
not require assumptions of issue orthogonality or rationality. This method exploits insights 
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from multi-attribute compositional analysis (Mac, but also known as conjoint analysis, 
vignette studies, and stated preferences analyses) to elicit the political preference of voters. As 
such, the method requires that voters simultaneously take into account the positions of 
political parties on different issues. They have to weigh the position on one issue against a 
position on another issue. For example, using this method, voters cannot always choose to 
increase spending on health care and education without cutting on other posts or exceeding 
the budget. Our introduction of Mac in a VAA coincides with the recent call from 
Hainmueller et al. (2014) for the use of Mac in causal inference in survey experiment in the 
political field. 
We argue that the multi-attribute compositional voter assistance application (or 
MacVAA) has three main improvements on existing VAAs. First, as it better mimics the 
actual decision-making process and reduces cognitive biases, it may be argued that MacVAA 
methodology provides a better advice on which party to vote for. Second, and related to the 
educational goal that VAAs have, MacVAAs not only educate people about important issues, 
but also educate them about the intrinsic complexity of electoral decision-making. The 
decision-making process mimics the reality political actors face when negotiating how to 
spend budgets and which laws to pass, and thus best reflects the reality of the political arena.  
The third advantage of the proposed method is that the obtained voter preferences can be used 
to make statements on the preferences of the public on the issues used in the application and 
also on the importance of the issues relative to each other. This information is not only 
relevant for public opinion researchers, but it could be also be vital information in countries 
that have a coalition system in which parties have to work together to form a government. To 
ensure the widest possible support for post-election negotiations, information on which 
positions and which issues are perceived to be most important by the electorate is an 
insightful tool. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the theory and 
practise of VAA’s and MacVAAs. In that section we provide the theoretical backgrounds and 
provide a general example of the MacVAA methodology. The third section describes how we 
field-tested a MacVAA during the Dutch 2012 Parliamentary elections and also describes 
results of this field-test. In the fourth and final section, we draw some conclusions. 
 
2. Theory and methodology 
There are many ways voters can arrive at a decision to vote for a particular party. One way in 
which voters decide on which party to vote for is by comparing their preferences on relevant 
issues with the stated positions of political parties on these issues (Franklin et al., 1992; 
Dalton, 1996). Cedroni and Garcia (2010) show that the theoretical model underlying issue 
preference voting is the so-called spatial model of rational decision-making (Downs, 1957). 
The spatial theory supposes that policies can be placed on a one-dimensional continuum. 
People decide who to vote for by comparing their own position on the continuum with the 
position taken by the various parties. To be able to do that, it is essential that (a) voters have a 
clear preference for certain policies, (b) parties have competing positions on these policies 
(Nie et al., 1979), and (c) voters are able to compare their own position on a certain policy to 
the position of the various parties (Butler and Stokes, 1969). To ensure that they are able to 
link their own preferences to those of parties, voters need information. However, information 
is costly to come by. To reduce the costs of information, VAAs are useful tools. 
 
2.1 Classic VAA’s 
As said before, VAAs have two goals: The first is to help voters in their choice for which 
party to vote for and to learn something about political choices in the process. The second is 
to be able to elicit voter preferences. Most VAAs achieve these goals by presenting users with 
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a sequence of consecutive propositions, about which both users and parties are assumed to 
have an opinion. To use an example from the 2012 Dutch Stemwijzer, the set of items that 
users were presented with included the following items (translated verbatim)
1
: 
 
[1] The deficit on the government budget should not exceed 3% in 2013.  
[12] Government should stop providing students with subsidies. From now on, students 
should loan money for their studies.  
[19] The tax deductibility of mortgage interests should not be limited any further. 
 
In response to these and other propositions, VAA users have to state their preference, most 
often on a Likert scale. In case of the Stemwijzer, a three point Likert scale is used, so users 
have to state whether they “Agree”, “Disagree” or have “No opinion”. This exercise is 
repeated for a set number of issues. An algorithm is then used to determine the congruence 
between the users’ stated preferences on the various issues and the various parties’ positions 
on the issues.  
 
2.2 Limitations to classic VAA’s 
Classis VAA’s have multiple well known limitations (sample representativeness, sensitivity to 
issue selection, and sensitivity to the calculation algorithms), but two more fundamental 
limitations exist. First, the subsequent nature of item presentation by definition assumes that 
voters’ and party preferences on the items are orthogonal. This assumption of orthogonality is 
demonstrably unrealistic. Parties base their campaign programs on a more or less logically 
consistent and coherent set of ideological base principles. As a consequence, positions taken 
by political parties are seldom uncorrelated, even in highly fractionalized multi-party systems. 
For example, parties that favor strong welfare states are also more likely to oppose labor 
                                                          
1. http://www.stemwijzer.nl/TK2012/index.html, last accessed on July 30, 2015.  
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market flexibilisation, and parties that oppose tax increases usually also argue for strong 
national defenses (Janssen, 2010).  
The assumption of orthogonality is also violated due to voter preferences. Hardly 
anybody fully agrees with all the positions of a political party, so the decision which party to 
vote for requires balancing the positions of different parties. Ideally, voters have to weigh the 
positions on different issues for each party and decide how to vote based on all the positions 
of all the issues by all the parties simultaneously. Moreover, voters might also assign different 
levels of importance to the various issues, to the extent to which they might choose one party 
over another solely because they agree with that party on a particular issue that is crucial to 
them, or they refuse to vote for one party because they disagree on one specific issue. Voters 
might be consciously aware of their own opinions on most issues, but they might not know 
their preferred rank-order of the various issues until they are forced to consciously evaluate 
the relative importance of the various issues that are politicized during election campaigns. 
Classic VAAs evade this important and educating part of the decision-making process. This is 
misleading, and may raise in voters unrealistic and false expectations of election outcomes. In 
our proposed MacVAA voters have to base their choice on all the positions of all the issues 
simultaneously. 
Second, classic VAAs assume that voters do have conscious prior preferences about 
which party to vote for in any given election, the assumption of rationality. Preferences may 
be fully rational in the sense that they reflect their best interests in this particular election, but 
that does not necessarily have to be the case. For example, voter preferences may be subject 
to bandwagon effects, where voters unwittingly adjust their preferences for political parties to 
align with perceived majority preferences (e.g. Nadeau, Cloutier and Guay, 1993; Mehrabian, 
1998; McAllister and Studlar, 1991; Goidel and Shields, 1994; Morwitz and Pluzinski, 1996). 
Relatedly, it is long recognized that people base their party preferences on the preferences of 
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significant others (see for example: Campbell et al., 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Sears, 
1975; Rose and McAllister, 1986), which may subject voting behavior to social desirability 
bias. Third, party preferences may be subject to cognitive inertia, in the sense that voter 
preferences may reflect their actual voting behavior in previous elections, while their beliefs 
about which party program best reflects their current interests may be outdated as in the 
meantime party programs may have changed. When presented with a thesis in a VAA, users 
may be guided by assumptions about the position on this issue that is held the party of their 
preferences. Confirmation bias will ensure that statements associated with preferred parties 
will be judged more favorably, and reactive devaluation (Lee and Constance, 1991) will 
ensure that the opposite happens to statements associated with parties one disagrees with. As a 
result, the outcome of the recommendation of VAAs may very well be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Note that this distortion is more severe if users are more well-informed. If this is 
the case, then the extent to which any recommendation algorithm is capable of producing a 
valid voting advice based on revealed preferences is limited. These issues caused by cognitive 
biases can be overcome by presenting the information in a way that does not assume 
orthogonality of issues or rationality of users, and as such, are a more realistic representation 
of the decision-making process. Our proposed MacVAA does exactly that. Hainmueller et al. 
(2014) also recognize that Mac’s does not require the assumption of rationality since Mac’s 
can estimate voter preferences “irrespective of the underlying behavioral model” (p.3). 
 
2.3 MacVAA 
We introduce a new technique to elicit voter preferences which integrates multi-attribute 
compositional analyses (Green, 1974; Louviere 1988; Gustavson et al., 2003) with a VAA 
and elevates the above described biases. Multi-attribute compositional analysis is used 
frequently in marketing and related fields to elicit prospective decision-makers’ stated 
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preferences about items that have multiple interdependent attributes. In a multi-attribute 
compositional analysis participants are presented with a sequence of decisions between a 
number of items that have a multiple characteristics that are relevant for the purchasing 
decision. Because of the multi-attribute nature of the items, prospective decision-makers have 
to make trade-offs between different varying characteristics of the item. The classic example 
is the decision to buy a car. Cars can be cheap or expensive, red or blue, have a maximum 
speed of 85 or 120 miles per hour, have a low mileage or a high one, etcetera. When asked, 
rationally calculating respondents should prefer a cheap car, with a low mileage, but a 
maximum speed of 120 miles per hour. However, such a car is unrealistic. In practice, 
attributes of cars are not orthogonal. As price and performance of cars covary, it would be 
more realistic to choose between a car that has a low mileage, is cheap and has a maximum 
speed of 85 miles per hour and a car that is expensive and can reach 120 miles per hour. Or 
perhaps respondents would be willing to compromise on the mileage to get the color they 
want.  
The choice voters have to make during elections is essentially very similar to the 
choice faced by a person who wants to buy a car. Voters have to choose between two or more 
parties. Parties take positions on various issues that may be important to voters to a varying 
degree. These positions can be seen as observable values of the parties. Hardly any voter will 
agree with all the positions of a single party. Rather, voters may choose for the party with 
which they agree the most or with which they agree on the most crucial issues. Voters will 
then make a trade-off between the positions on different issues from a single party, and 
between the different positions on a single issue of multiple parties. Voters have to weigh how 
important the respective issues are to them, and then decide on which party they like best.  
To exemplify how MacVAAs model these complex choice processes, figure 1 presents 
an example of a VAA using fictional political parties’ election programs. It depicts three 
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fictive political parties and their positions on five issues. The three political parties are 
referred to as three vignettes, while the different issues are called attributes and the positions 
are values of the attributes. This example simplifies the choice of which political party to vote 
for to a trade-off between different issues and different positions on those issues. MacVAA 
methodology does exactly that: it presents participants with a trade-off between three fictive 
party programs and it does so a fixed number of times. Each time the values to the attributes 
are allocated at random among the fictive parties and each time the participant is required to 
choose one party program over the other two. At the end of the application, participants have 
thus been repeatedly presented with a fixed number of choices, each between three fictive 
party programs. Some of these might have reflected the positions of existing parties, but due 
to the random nature of the way attributes are assigned to vignettes, most will not represent 
existing parties, and might not even be realistic.  
 
Figure 1. Fictional example of one choice set (containing three vignettes) 
  Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 
Education spending Increase it Lower it Increase it 
Social security Make it more generous Keep it like it is Lower access 
Renewable energy Eliminate subsidies Subsidize Subsidize 
Health care costs Lower them Increase them Make them income dependent 
Government budget deficit >3% is allowed Keep it <=3% >3% is allowed 
 
The choice of program within each choice set reveals part of participants’ preferences. Taking 
the decisions participants made in all the different choice sets allows for eliciting their overall 
preferences. At the end of the application, participants can then be presented with an overview 
of the similarity between their positions on the issues covered and the positions of the 
available parties.  
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Note that the attributes must correspond to issues that may be electorally important, 
and that the values of the attributes come from the positions that various parties take on these 
issues. Also note that where classic VAA designs assume that these issues are orthogonal, the 
multi-attribute design does not require this. MacVAAs by design reduce the effects of 
confirmation bias in two ways. First, issues are not phrased as theses, but as attributes of party 
programs. These programs do not necessarily correspond with actual party programs, which 
make linking programs to previously held preferences for political parties very cognitively 
demanding. Second, decision-making is less distorted by confirmation bias since the choice 
options are presented simultaneously, rather than sequentially (Jona et al., 2001).  
 
3. MacVAA in practice: De Politieke Weegschaal 
In this section, we describe how we field-tested a MacVAA in the 2012 Dutch Parliamentary 
Elections under the name Politieke Weegschaal (Political Scale, henceforth: PW). We 
describe the context, and provide concrete descriptions of our mode of operations and the 
decisions we made. 
 
3.1 Context 
On the 23
rd
 of April in 2012 the Dutch government stepped down and new elections were 
announced. During this election 21 political parties were on the ballot and voters had to 
choose one person from one party. From the results of this election two parties together 
formed a majority in parliament. A few weeks after the Dutch government stepped down all 
21 political parties had presented preliminary programs for the upcoming years. In June most 
parties had a final version of their programs. Because the summer period was in between the 
fall of the government and the new elections, the campaign was short but intense with a 
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number of final debates at the beginning of September. The elections were held the 12
th
 of 
September 2012.  
 
3.2 Issue selection  
One of the main decisions that VAA developers have to make is which issues to adopt in the 
instrument. This is crucial to the outcome. For instance, Groot (2003) criticizes the 
StemWijzer and the specific statements and the party positioning it used in the 2002 national 
elections. Groot (2003) argues that the range of statements did not cover the most important 
issues in the elections, the statements did not allow for enough discriminatory power between 
parties, political parties had a too large role in their positioning on the statements and that in 
other instances the positioning of parties did not seem to reflect the real position of the parties 
on the issues. Walgrave et al. (2009) argue that the choice of statements in a VAA has a large 
impact on the resulting recommendations. They arrive at different recommendations for the 
same people if they use varying sets of 36 statements from a sample of 50 statements.  
In the field test, we, first, searched the actual party programs for matching issues and 
then categorized party positions on these issues. We limited ourselves to the 10 political 
parties that already had seats in parliament. In order to be adopted in the VAA, issues had to 
be important during elections, but practical limitations also existed, as not all parties 
expressed positions on all relevant issues. To identify issues important for voters, we used a 
clear decision-rule. Issues were eligible for adoption in our MacVAA if and only if they 
satisfied two conditions: 1) they had to be among the largest posts on the annual government 
budget, and 2) all parties had an expressed position on them in their election program. 
Multi-attribute compositional tests are highly cognitively demanding (Ramirez-
Huartardez, 2009). To prevent users from dropping out, we limited the number of issues (the 
attributes) to 7 and the maximum number of positions on these issues (the values) to 4. The 
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seven issues (attributes) we used are the study subsidy of bachelor students, the duration and 
amount of unemployment benefits, the policy to tax car use by the kilometer, renewable 
energy, the tax deductibility of mortgage costs, health care deductibles and the government 
finances. The first six were major items on the budget, either in the sense of revenues or of 
costs, the last one is an attribute regarding the budget itself. In almost all instances did 
political parties mention their position on the issue in their program. The parties were either in 
favor, against it or preferred the status quo and we categorized them accordingly. Figure 2 
presents all attributes and values we used in the field test. 
 
Figure 2. Attributes and values of the PW 
 
Attributes/Political issues Values/Political positions 
Education: study subsidy bachelor  
Change into a 
social loan 
system 
Maintain it   
Social security: Unemployment 
benefits: duration and amount 
Shorten it 
Shorten it but 
higher amount 
Maintain it 
 
Transportation: car use taxed by 
the kilometer 
(Gradually) 
implement it 
Neutral 
Do not 
implement it  
Renewable energy 
Eliminate 
subsidies 
Subsidize 
and/or make it 
mandatory 
  
Housing: tax deductibility of 
mortgage costs 
(Gradually) 
abolish it 
Limit it Maintain it 
 
Health care: deductibles Increase them 
Make them 
income 
dependent 
Neutral Lower them 
Finances: government budget 
deficit 
Keep it <=3% 
>3% is 
allowed   
 
Krouwel et al. (2014) argue that the party positions on the statements used in the VAAs 
should best be based upon expert opinions combined with information from the party 
programs. We consulted with the political parties whether they agreed with our 
categorization. We did however not change a party position in the field test without a valid 
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reasoning from the party representative, which was based on explicit quotations from election 
programs that proved our categorization wrong.   
 
3.3 Recommendation 
From users’ answers, we derived a recommendation. Literature shows that the algorithm with 
which recommendations are computed is crucial. For example, Kleinnijenhuis and Krouwel 
(2008) argue that VAAs work best when the recommendations are based upon a multi-
dimensional scale. The authors compare three VAAs (StemWijzer, Stemtest, and the second 
largest Dutch VAA Kieskompas) which all use different decision rules for the 
recommendation. The StemWijzer solely counts the number of statements the participants 
agrees with each party, the Stemtest weights these answers using the relative dominance of the 
issues in each party’s program and the Kieskompas adds another feature, namely that both the 
parties and the participants are positioned on a two dimensional plane. Wagner and 
Ruusuvirta (2012) compare thirteen VAAs in seven European countries to elicit the model on 
which the recommendations are based. Most VAAs are able to match voters to parties 
relatively well using “issue based proximity models”, but do less well on smaller issues which 
are prominent in fewer statements. Also Louwerse and Rosema (2014) are concerned with the 
calculation of the recommendation as they find that participants of the StemWijzer would have 
received different recommendations if different calculation methods were used. 
 In accordance with this literature, we decided to use a simple and straightforward 
algorithm for computing a voting recommendation. For each fictive party program we 
calculated the percentage which the program had in common with the program of each actual 
political party. Using these percentages, we calculated the average percentage of agreement 
between the chosen fictive parties by the applicants for each party. The applicant was then 
presented with a list of percentages, one percenatge for each actual political party, which 
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indicated for each party how much the choices of the applicant were in common with the 
party program of that party.  
 
3.4 Marketing 
We were able to obtain some (local) publicity but the PW was mostly reached through social 
media and personal contacts. There was some local news coverage for the PW in the province 
of our university (Radio station L1, university magazine De Observant), the PW was included 
in a number of lists of different VAAs available to voters (e.g. the website of the national 
magazine Elsevier) and on some blogs (e.g. Maastricht Aktueel). However, the primary news 
source through which our users found out about the PW was social media. We had set up a 
twitter and Facebook account and ask all our friends to spread the word. 
 
3.5 Field-test 
On August 18, we launched the PW. The MacVAA was online until one day after the 
elections, e.g. September 12, 2012. In the four weeks leading up to the Dutch national 
elections in 2012 the PW was consulted 4954 times and participants together saw 173,391 
choices. In theory every participant viewed 15 choice sets of 3 options, thus leading to 45 
observations per participant. However, 1435 participants did not finish the application and 
thus did not view all 15 choice sets.
2
  We logged the choices made by all respondents, as well 
as their stated answers on some background characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2. For some time we had server problems which prevented participants from finishing the application. 
However, follow up interviews revealed that the application was considered too time consuming by some, 
and that some participants stopped using the application prematurely. 
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3.6 Analyses 
Data from MacVAAs can be used to elicit information about voter preferences.
3
 Three types 
of information can be derived: 1) information about the extent to which attributes increase the 
probability that a party program is chosen over others, 2) information of the relative 
importance of issues for party choice, and 3) information about the popularity of actual party 
programs. To exemplify the potential applicability of MacVAAs for voter opinion research, 
we perform three such analyses using actual data we obtained from the field test. 
First, MacVAA data can be used to elicit the relevance the various attributes have for 
the decision between party programs. To this end, we analyzed the data from the field tested 
multi-attribute compositional VAA with a conditional fixed effect logistic regression, to take 
into account the dependency between the three options in each choice set, and we cluster on 
individuals. The results in Table 1 show that a party program (“vignette”) is more likely to be 
chosen if it states that the study subsidy and the unemployment benefits are maintained, car 
use will not be taxed by the km, renewable energy stimulation is intensified, the tax 
deductibility of mortgage costs is limited, health care deductibles are either made income 
dependent or are lowered and the government budget in 2012 will be below three per cent (as 
required by the European Union).  
 
Table 1. The impact of positions on political issues on the probability that the party  
program is chosen (odds ratios) 
Attribute 
Contribution of attribute to the 
probability that a party program 
is chosen 
 Education: study subsidy bachelor 
   maintain it ref 
  change into a social loan system 0.73*** 
 
(0.023) 
 
                                                          
3. Data are for the most part subject to the same limitations that data from other VAAs are subject to. More 
information about data is presented in the Data Appendix. 
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Social security: Unemployment benefits: duration and amount  
  maintain it ref 
  shorten it 0.69*** 
 
(0.023) 
 shorten it but higher amount 0.81*** 
 
(0.023) 
Transportation: car use taxed by the kilometer  
  Neutral ref 
  (Gradually) implement it 0.91*** 
 
(0.023) 
 Do not implement it 1.15*** 
 
(0.03) 
Renewable energy  
Subsidize and/or make it mandatory ref 
Eliminate subsidies 0.69*** 
 
(0.024) 
Housing: tax deductibility of mortgage costs  
  Maintain it ref 
  (Gradually) abolish it 0.88*** 
 
(0.04) 
  Limit it 1.13*** 
 
(0.04) 
Health care: deductibles  
  Neutral ref 
  Increase them 0.489*** 
 
(0.02) 
 Make them income dependent 1.54*** 
 
(0.056) 
 Lower them 1.26*** 
 
(0.045) 
Finances: government budget deficit  
   >3% is allowed ref 
   Keep it <=3% 1.53*** 
 
(0.06) 
  Observations 147,513 
Clusters 4184 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0858 
Notes: Standard errros in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table shows estimates which are weighted, grouped at id 
and choice set, and clustered at the individual level.  
 
The results indicate that voters in the 2012 Netherlands’ election would like to increase their 
own benefits without exceeding the government budget.
4
 However, participants appear to be 
                                                          
4. The results should of course not be generalized to the entire population given the limitations of the sample, as also 
discussed in the data appendix. 
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willing to limit the tax deductibility of mortgage costs, a policy that would be negative for all 
home owners.  
In addition to the identification of positions, it is possible from the above presented 
results to obtain an importance ranking of issues by users, using the following equation: 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =
|?̅?𝑖| − |𝑥𝑖|
∑ |?̅?𝑖| − |𝑥𝑖|
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (1) 
where the relative importance of attribute i is dependent on the absolute difference between 
the highest and lowest coefficient of the values of a single attribute over the sum of absolutes 
differences of all the attributes. This measure of relative importance is very similar to the 
average marginal component effect of Hainmueller et al. (2014).  
Table 2 states that health care and the government finances were the most important 
aspects of party programs, as we elicit from the choice of participants. Thus although 
maintaining or only limiting the tax deductibility of mortgage costs is preferred by the 
participants, they would rather keep the budget deficit below 3 per cent.  
Table 2. Importance of the different issues for voter preferences 
Issues 
 
Importance 
Health care: deductibles 0.21 
Finances: government budget deficit 2013 0.21 
Renewable energy 0.19 
Education: study subsidy bachelor 0.16 
Social security: Unemployment benefits: duration and amount 0.10 
Transportation: car use taxed by the kilometer 0.07 
Housing: tax deductibility of mortgage costs 0.06 
Notes: Results based on equation (1) and the results in Table 1. 
 
All age and gender groups care most about health care: either increasing deductibles or 
making them income dependent. The least important issue for older people (45 and up) and 
men is the tax deductibility of mortgage costs. While women and people under 45 care least 
about the policy to tax car use by the kilometer. People below 45 rank the importance of the 
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study subsidy for bachelor students as third important, and people under 25 rank it as second 
most important issue.
5
 
A third type of information that can be obtained from multi-attribute compositional 
surveys regard the popularity of real choice options, which can be seen as a combination of 
the first two analyses. These analyses provide information interesting for political parties 
when new party programs have to be written. The vignettes most often and least often chosen 
in our field test are depicted in Figure 3. The most often chosen vignette was chosen 70 per 
cent of the time it was shown, the vignette least chosen was only chosen in 4 per cent of cases. 
The information distilled from Figure 3 is very similar to that seen in Table 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 3. Most and least often chosen vignettes. 
Chosen most often Chosen least often 
Education: study subsidy bachelor: 
 maintain it 
Education: study subsidy bachelor:  
change into a loan system 
Transportation: car use taxed by the kilometer:  
neutral 
Transportation: car use taxed by the kilometer:  
neutral 
Social security: Unemployment benefits:  
duration and amount: maintain it 
Social security: Unemployment benefits:  
duration and amount: shorten it 
Renewable energy:   
Subsidize and/or make it mandatory  
Renewable energy:   
Eliminate subsidies 
Housing: tax deductibility of mortgage costs:   
Limit it 
Housing: tax deductibility of mortgage costs:   
Maintain it 
Health care: deductibles: 
 Make them income dependent 
Health care: deductibles: 
Increase them 
Finances: government budget deficit:  
Keep it <=3% 
Finances: government budget deficit:  
>3% is allowed 
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
VAAs are increasingly important instruments that voters can use to determine their vote 
during elections. Empirical studies show that VAAs do affect voter behavior. Walgrave et al. 
(2006) find effects on final voter decisions of the use of a VAA in the Belgium elections in 
                                                          
5. Results available on request.  
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2004. Similar evidence exists for voters in Switzerland (Fivaz et al., 2010). Wall et al. (2014) 
show that in the Netherlands especially voters who had preferences for multiple parties before 
consulting the VAA were more likely to follow the recommendation by the VAA. Ruusuvirta 
and Rosema (2009) find similar results and also find a small effect of VAAs on voter turnout.   
The quality of VAAs thus is an academic discussion with direct real-life implications. 
Although there are VAAs in a number of countries and there is made some headway in 
improving the existing VAAs, as far as we know, all VAAs share a design that relies on the 
subsequent presentation of statements. In this contribution, we identified two unrealistic 
assumptions that underlie this design, i.e. the issues of issue orthogonality and the issue of 
rational decision-makers. We show that these two assumptions increase the probability that 
decision-making using classic VAAs is distorted and that classic VAAs unjustly present 
electoral decision-making as a decision without tradeoffs. To counter this, we presented the 
methodology of an innovative integration of multi-attribute compositional research designs 
and voting advice applications (MacVAAs). We also presented results from a field 
experiment done with a MacVAA.  
It is important to note that the MacVAA model suffers from many of the limitations of 
classical VAAs. For instance, as is the case with classic VAAs, the outcome is highly 
dependent on the selection of issues that are adopted in the instrument (Groot, 2003; 
Walgrave et al., 2009; Krouwel et al., 2014). It could be argued that this problem is even 
more pressing for MacVAAs, since the relatively high cognitive demand the multi-attribute 
design places on users, naturally limits the number of issues that can be addressed.  
Nonetheless, MacVAA methodology arguably improves on classic VAAs in three 
main ways. First, we argued that the multi-attribute design provides a better way to educate 
voters on the political process in which trade-offs are often present. Second, MacVAAs 
provide voters with a voting advice that is less distorted by cognitive biases. Third, they 
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potentially provide researchers with a more reliable way to elicit voter preferences, to be used 
either for academic interest or for politicians to understand election results. In that sense, we 
argue that multi-attribute compositional voting advice applications fulfill the key functions of 
VAAs better than the classic design does. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
  
Data obtained through MacVAAs can be used for public opinion research. In this paper, we 
aimed to provide examples of the types of information that can be elicited using MacVAAs. It 
should be noted that many of the caveats that apply to classic VAAs also apply to MacVAAs. 
For example, since most of our users learned about the PW from social media, we did not 
obtain a representative sample of the Dutch population. Wall et al. (2009) look at the elections 
in Ireland in 2007 and find that the users of VAA were not a representative sample of the Irish 
population and that people inclined to vote for two of the main parties in Ireland were not 
identified as such.  
Data elicited with a MacVAA suffer from the same problem in which the sample is 
not representative for the population. In our sample, higher educated and men are 
overrepresented. Table 1 compares our sample to the Dutch population. To be able to make 
statements on the voter preferences of the Dutch population, in our analyses we weight our 
observations to the population distribution. With this in mind we delete all users for which we 
do not have the age, gender or the educational level and those above the age of 74 since for 
people of 75 and above CBS Statistics Netherlands does not provide information. This leaves 
us with a total of 147,513 observations, coming from 2998 participants who completed the 
application and 1186 participants who did not finish.  
Another common issue we cannot address is that some people might have consulted 
our application multiple times. Especially participants who did not finish the application in 
their first try might have tried again at a later moment. These participants will be in our 
database twice since we cannot identify them. In the following analyses, we delete all users 
under the age of 18 since they were not eligible to vote. We further delete those for which the 
education level could not have been obtained with certain ages.  
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Table A1. Population and sample distribution 
 Gender: Men Women  
 Educational 
level: 
Prim. 
edu. 
Pre-voc. 
sec. edu. 
Voc. & 
gen. 
sec.edu.  
Tert. 
edu. 
Total Prim. 
edu. 
Pre-voc. 
sec. edu. 
Voc. & 
gen. sec. 
edu.  
Tert. 
edu. 
Total 
Dutch population 
15<age<25 0.007 0.036 0.044 0.003 0.090 0.005 0.033 0.044 0.006 0.088 
25>age<=35 0.003 0.011 0.046 0.019 0.078 0.002 0.008 0.042 0.023 0.076 
35>age<=45 0.004 0.014 0.052 0.022 0.091 0.003 0.014 0.056 0.021 0.094 
45>age<=55 0.005 0.017 0.053 0.021 0.096 0.006 0.020 0.057 0.017 0.100 
55>age<=65 0.006 0.014 0.043 0.018 0.081 0.009 0.025 0.037 0.012 0.082 
age>65 0.007 0.013 0.033 0.010 0.063 0.010 0.021 0.024 0.005 0.060 
Total 0.031 0.106 0.269 0.093 0.499 0.035 0.121 0.260 0.084 0.501 
Our sample 
15<age<25 0.003 0.004 0.048 0.040 0.095 0.002 0.004 0.033 0.040 0.078 
25>age<=35 0.000 0.004 0.038 0.150 0.192 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.090 0.110 
35>age<=45 0.000 0.004 0.034 0.092 0.130 0.000 0.002 0.023 0.054 0.080 
45>age<=55 0.000 0.006 0.028 0.064 0.098 0.000 0.003 0.024 0.040 0.068 
55>age<=65 0.000 0.006 0.022 0.044 0.073 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.029 0.044 
age>65 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.014 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.010 
Total 0.004 0.026 0.176 0.404 0.610 0.002 0.015 0.114 0.259 0.390 
Source: CBS (2012) and own calculations.  
 
